Learning from Veterans

3 Comments

1. Sydney Freedberg wrote:

   Now online are my stories on the official roll-out of the full budget.

   First, on a $4 billion accounting gimmick in the Army’s favor:

   It’s budget day, so keep your eye on the cups as budgeteers move them round and round. In real life, the Army will shrink steadily from its peak of almost 570,000 soldiers to 490,000 by 2017. But, on paper, in the Pentagon’s base budget for 2013, that shrinkage will happen overnight at the beginning of the new fiscal year. On October 1st, 2012, some 49,700 soldiers will magically vanish from the base budget for FY 2013 and instead be funded out of “overseas contingency operations” (OCO)….

   Second, an in-depth look at the Army’s big bet on a small part of the budget, the Administration’s investment in training and advising foreign forces:

   The service’s strategy? Leverage the administration’s interest in rebuilding military-to-military relationships around the world – long overshadowed by the simultaneous wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – by launching an ambitious but relatively cheap program of international wargames, advisor missions, officer exchanges, and other efforts to “build partnership capacity.” As the Army seeks to redefine itself for the post-war era, the new strategy will mean more investment in Special Forces, which have always emphasized this mission. But the Army plans to go beyond this traditional mission for Special Forces and wants to enhance the ability of regular Army units to work with foreign troops around the globe.

   Click on the excerpts above to see the full articles or check out all my recent stories online at AOL Defense.

   Wednesday, February 15, 2012 at 9:07 am | Permalink
2. David Maxwell wrote:

   I would still like to see the analysis of the demand signal for operations on the scale postulated by this article. I have a hard time seeing the requirement for large numbers of Regular Forces conducting this mission around the world. And I would really like to see the “low cost” and “small footprint” concept for Regular Forces. That said I will take exception to this quote:

   “One area of almost universal agreement, however, was the need for the Army as a whole to take on missions once reserved for the Special Forces, and for main-force units at all levels of command to work more closely with the special operators.”

   The perpetuation of the myth that this “mission” was “once reserved” for the Special Forces illustrates a lack of understanding of doctrine as well as the history of military operations. Doctrine was clear before 9-11; all services were required to provide forces trained and ready to conduct Foreign Internal Defense though it is true that at best lip service was paid to this requirement, and the assumption was that SOF could handle this mission (and Title 10, sec 167 says that insofar as it applies to special operations, FID is a SOF mission but by definition this does not make it a SOF exclusive mission). But more importantly, Regular Forces routinely have conducted various forms of advisory and training missions under Title 22 for security assistance for decades. This “mission,” while dominated by Special Forces because it is inherent in the operations that Special Forces conduct, was never reserved for SF nor SF or SOF exclusive. It was just neglected, not prioritized and not deemed a necessary mission prior to 9-11. But of course better, more effective Regular and Special Operations Forces integration is important and the right path to follow.

   Wednesday, February 15, 2012 at 9:15 am | Permalink
3. Sydney Freedberg wrote:

   Dr. Maxwell: Your point’s well taken — and includes some history I didn’t know.

   All: Dr. Maxwell is a retired Army Special Forces Colonel who now teaches at Georgetown University’s Strategic Studies program (click here for bio). Many of his writings on this and related topics are online at Small Wars Journal.

   Wednesday, February 15, 2012 at 9:21 am | Permalink

Post a Comment